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Abstract
The evidence that many of the findings in the published literature may be unreliable is compelling. There is an
excess of positive results, often from studies with small sample sizes, or other methodological limitations, and the
conspicuous absence of null findings from studies of a similar quality. This distorts the evidence base, leading to
false conclusions and undermining scientific progress. Central to this problem is a peer-review system where the
decisions of authors, reviewers, and editors are more influenced by impressive results than they are by the validity
of the study design. To address this, BMC Psychology is launching a pilot to trial a new ‘results-free’ peer-review
process, whereby editors and reviewers are blinded to the study’s results, initially assessing manuscripts on the
scientific merits of the rationale and methods alone. The aim is to improve the reliability and quality of published
research, by focusing editorial decisions on the rigour of the methods, and preventing impressive ends justifying
poor means.
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Introduction
Psychology has received much criticism of late, with
classic findings failing to replicate, and high-profile cases
of scientific fraud [24, 45]. Psychology is not alone. The
evidence of unreliable findings across biomedical and so-
cial sciences is compelling [2, 15, 20, 36, 42]. There is a
surfeit of studies reporting significant positive results
(typically, p < 0.05), often from studies with small sample
sizes, or other methodological limitations, and a con-
spicuous absence of the corresponding null findings
from studies of a similar quality. This distorts the evidence
base, increasing the proportion of false positive findings,
and leading to biased estimates in meta-analyses.
Central to the problem is the peer-review system, and
the role it plays in perpetuating biases in the published
record; generally, authors, reviewers, and editors prefer
results which show support for tested hypotheses and
are prejudiced against submitting or publishing incon-
clusive or null findings. Rosenthal famously referred to this
as the file drawer problem [33]; statistically significant
findings which support the alternative hypothesis are pub-
lished, while those studies with inconclusive or negative re-
sults languish in the author’s file drawer, hidden from peer
and public awareness.
As will be discussed, there are many factors that bias
the decision-making of authors, reviewers and editors
throughout the publication process to the detriment of a
reliable evidence base. In the absence of external pres-
sures, the simple human desire for seeking information
that supports one’s beliefs, and ignoring that which does
not [1, 26], means authors are more likely to find, and
reviewers to believe, evidence that confirms accepted
theories. There are also differences in interpretability of
positive and null findings (compounded by common de-
sign flaws such as having low statistical power) which
mean that positive results can be misguidedly seen to
overcome methodological weakness that would be crit-
ical for a null finding.
The bias for positive results is further exacerbated by
the external influence of a competitive research culture.
Publications are the prime currency for advancing aca-
demic careers [43], and where editorial decisions are seen
to favour positive results, researchers are encouraged to
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adopt practices to boost their chances of finding positive
results [38]. These practices often increase the risk of find-
ings being false positive or inflated estimates, and thus fur-
ther undermine scientific progress [5]. However, in the
competition for publication, this risk is either ignored, or
accepted as a price worth paying.
In order to improve the quality and reliability of pub-
lished research, the criteria determining publication
must be aligned with those for conducting rigorous sci-
entific practice. The purpose of scientific enquiry is to
estimate the presence and size of causal associations,
and results from studies designed and conducted to the
highest standards of scientific rigour will provide the
most reliable and informative estimates. Thus, for the
optimal advancement of science it seems logical that de-
cisions regarding what to publish would be better based
on judging quality, rather than results [11]. One way to
achieve this would be ‘results-free’ review, where results
are hidden from editors and reviewers, forcing reviewer
reports and editorial decisions to be based on the scien-
tific rigour of the study design alone.
This month BMC Psychology launches a pilot to trial a
new ‘results-free’ peer-review process, to address the
problem of bias in the editorial process. Editors and re-
viewers will be blinded to the study’s results, and decide
whether to accept or reject manuscripts based on the
scientific merits of their rationale and methods alone.
There are multiple insidious ways in which the fixation
on positive results biases decision to the general detri-
ment of science, and as outlined below, ‘results-free’ re-
view has the potential to address many of them.
Publication bias
Publication bias is the term for what occurs whenever
the research findings in the published literature differ
systematically from the population of all studies com-
pleted in a given area [34]. Publication bias arises from
the decisions of investigators, reviewers, and editors to
submit or accept manuscripts for publication based on
certain study characteristics. This would be beneficial if
decisions were made solely on study quality [11]. How-
ever, publication decisions are most influenced by the
direction or strength of the study finding; strong results
clearly in favour of the study hypothesis are overrepre-
sented, while studies reporting mixed or null findings
are underrepresented.
Psychologists provided some of the first empirical
evidence that the literature was biased towards positive
results [10, 18, 26, 37, 39–41]. In 1959, Sterling found
that of all the articles which used tests of significance
published in 4 journals, 97% found in favour of the al-
ternative hypothesis. However, despite psychologists’
early awareness of the dangers of such a publication
bias, psychology has been relatively slow to intervene
and, in a similar analysis in 2010, over 92% of psych-
ology/psychiatry papers were still found to claim sup-
port for their tested hypothesis [12], suggesting that the
degree of publication bias has remained high.
Basing decisions to publish on the nature of a study’s
results is wasteful. It distorts the evidence available for
policy makers and other key stakeholders, leading to
false conclusions which can have severe consequences.
In the biomedical literature, this can put patients at risk
if the published evidence falsely suggests that ineffectual
or harmful treatments work [17]. Selectively publishing
positive results also hinders the incremental progression
of science, and may explain the paucity of basic findings
translating into clinical applications [21, 31, 32]. Many a
PhD student has been demoralised to find they have
wasted a year or more of their training trying to replicate
and build on seemingly well-established findings only to
find out that many others have also tried and failed, but
their null findings were unpublished.
However, despite the undermining effects of publica-
tion bias on the evidence base, it persists for a variety of
reasons. At a relatively simple level, there are asymmet-
ries in the dominant model of statistical inference which
mean that null findings are more difficult to interpret,
and more afflicted by the limitations of poor study de-
sign, than positive results. Thus authors are less inclined
to write them up and reviewers more inclined to reject.
At a systemic level, career pressures to publish offer a
sharp incentive to authors to favour writing up papers
with the greatest chance of success, and under the
current system of publication this will inevitably favour
positive results.
The problem of interpreting null results
A major contributing factor to both reviewer and author
decisions to publish is the differences in interpretability
of positive and null findings. Despite its many docu-
mented problems, Null hypothesis significance testing
(NHST) remains the dominant framework for much
experimental psychological research. However, there
are asymmetries in the inferences one draws in this
approach that mean null results are more difficult to
interpret than positive ones. NHST is a hybrid of Fisher’s
concept of null hypothesis testing [14], and the Neyman-
Pearson concepts of Type I (α) and Type II error (β) and
statistical power (1-β), but its application tends to lean
most on Fisher’s concept of null hypothesis testing ([44];
[7], in press).
The first asymmetry arises in the strength of inferen-
tial claim. Obtain a positive result (p < 0.05) and one can
boldly reject the null hypothesis and claim evidence of
an effect. However, obtain a null result, and one has sim-
ply failed to reject the null hypothesis; one cannot claim
evidence of no effect. The second and related asymmetry
Button et al. BMC Psychology  (2016) 4:59 Page 2 of 7
presents in the different weighting researchers give to
the risk of type I and II errors. Text-book research de-
signs adopt a 5% Type I error rate (p < 0.05), while
accepting a higher Type II error rate of 20% (i.e., 80%
power). In practice, however, the asymmetry is even
greater - researchers ostensibly adhere to the 5% type
I rate but seem to pay little mind to statistical power,
and studies with power as low as 20% are common [5].
The impact this has on author and editorial decisions
is best illustrated with an example: Suppose a researcher
runs a series of studies with 20% statistical power (and
thus a type II error rate of 80%), and sets the significance
threshold at 5%. A null result is uninformative. The study
design is so poor (in terms of having insufficient statistical
power) that the researcher expects 80% of the studies to
miss genuine effects. As a null result is more likely than
not to be an (type II) error, the researcher decides it is not
worth writing up. If, on the other hand, the researcher
finds a result that passes the 5% significance threshold,
they might convince themselves (and the reviewers) that
despite the low power, the finding is worthy of publication
as the chance of it being an (type I) error is only 5%. While
in the case of a single study this decision making may
seem reasonable, it is clearly problematic when considered
across a population of studies.
The above example illustrates how the importance
attributed to methodological limitations, such as low
power, is highly influenced by the results. As methodo-
logical limitations tend to reduce a study’s sensitivity to de-
tecting effects (via increasing standard errors), null results
are often seen as an expected consequence of poor design.
In contrast, finding a statistically significant result in a study
of similar quality is often interpreted as a success, because
the effect was found ‘despite the limitations’ of small sample
size, or measurement error. Indeed, passing the significance
threshold may be seen as indicative of how large, or robust
that effect must be [13]. Thus a third asymmetry arises in
study quality; design limitations are seen to weaken the case
for publishing a null result, while passing the 5% signifi-
cance criterion can be seen as a golden ticket for dismissing
away methodological concerns.
Perhaps because of the differences in interpretation,
reviewers have been shown to be highly influenced by
the direction and strength of effects [11]. On average,
null papers take several months longer from the time of
submission to eventual publication than positive papers
(median, 1.1 vs 0.8 years; P = .04), suggesting that null
results receive more criticism during the peer-review
process [19]. This delay may stem from the increased
difficulties of trying to persuade reviewers of the merits
of null findings.
Reviewers have also been found to judge the methods
and quality of null studies more critically than those of
positive studies. Mahoney [26] randomly assigned referees
to review 1 of 5 versions of a manuscript, all with identical
introduction and methods sections, but different results
and discussion sections (positive, negative, methods only,
mixed results with positive discussion, mixed results with
negative discussion) . The methods, data presentation, sci-
entific contribution, and publication merit of manuscripts
with positive results were rated as being nearly twice as
high as manuscripts with negative results. Thus, negative
findings seem to disproportionally and detrimentally affect
appraisals of study quality and merit. This suggests that
any attempts to base editorial decisions on methodological
merit, are likely to be biased if the results are known.
Reviewers and editors act as the gatekeepers to publi-
cation, and may hinder the progress of null findings that
contradict their beliefs. Researchers can become welded
to certain theories or ideas, promoting the evidence that
supports the scientific dogma, while dismissing that
which does not. Examining sex bias in psychotherapy,
Smith [40] found that while the published literature sup-
ported the widely held notion that the standards clini-
cians’ hold regarding mental health are biased against
women, the unpublished data obtained from data re-
quests was found to show the same degree of bias but in
the opposite direction. Similar to those reporting null re-
sults, studies with results that contradict the scientific
dogma may be less likely to be submitted or face more
hurdles to persuading reviewers that they are worthy of
publication.
Authors’ decisions and career pressures
Analysing a discrete population of conducted studies
(Time-Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences, k = 221),
Franco and colleagues found that strong results were 60%
more likely to be written up, and 40% more likely to be
published, than null results [16]. When asked why they
choose not to write up their null findings, 15 out of the
26 authors who replied suggested it was in the belief
that null results have little publication potential. Based
on the asymmetries described above, the authors’ deci-
sions not to pursue null papers seem reasonable given
the uphill struggle null papers face during the review
process.
Academics are under increasing career competition
and peer-reviewed publications, citations, and grant
funding are the prime currencies for advancing academic
research careers. Over the past 30 years, the number of
faculty positions in the US has remained relatively con-
stant, but the number of PhDs awarded has increased
substantially [35]. The competition for faculty positions
is therefore fierce. Once secured, retaining a faculty
position can be dependent on meeting key performance
targets, and the main indicators of academic success
are number of publications, journal impact factors and
number of citations [43].
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As has been discussed, in the current publication sys-
tem, positive results are more easily published, especially
those studies reporting large effects which, despite meth-
odological limitations, are often published in high-
impact journals. Indeed, meta-analyses have found that
the degree of inflation in positive results correlates to
the impact factor of the publishing journal, with highly
biased results from small studies published in some of
the highest impact journals [27]. In addition to being
easier to publish in higher impact journals, positive re-
sults are also more likely to be cited once published,
thus further increasing the incentives for authors to find
them [25].
All of this combines to create a powerful incentive
structure for authors to find certain results, and powerful
incentives lead to biased decision making. For example,
pharmaceutical companies have received much criticism
for prioritising the publication of trials showing drugs to
be highly effective, while delaying or suppressing the pub-
lication of data suggesting more modest effects [3, 17].
While financial incentives are an obvious source of bias in
pharma, academics operating in such a competitive career
culture may be equally at risk of bias. Indeed, the evidence
produced in competitive research environments may be
particularly unreliable, with the proportion of studies
reporting positive results increasing with increased com-
petition in US research institutions [12].
This pressure to publish in a publication system that
favours positive results undermines scientific integrity,
both by dissuading authors from publishing null find-
ings, but also by incentivising researchers to adopt ques-
tionable research practices to maximise their chances of
finding something positive, and thus more publishable,
in each data set [12]. Flexible analytical procedures [38],
especially in low-powered studies, can generate a large
number of positive results, although most will either be
false positive or inflated [5]. Researchers may incorrectly
write these analyses up as if they were confirmatory
tests, retro-fitting a new hypothesis to explain a chance
result [22].
There are numerous ‘questionable research practices’
which authors can use to exploit the multiple decision
points during data collection and analysis to generate
positive results [22]. These include the removal of an
outlier, transforming a variable, collecting more data,
switching outcome variables, adding or removing covari-
ates, until one happens upon a significant result [38].
Researchers may then forget about the unsuccessful
paths, and write-up only those which yielded statistically
significant results [29]. There is good evidence that such
undisclosed flexibility in analysis is common practice. In
a survey of 2000 psychologists, over half admitted to
having failed to report all dependent measures, and select-
ively reporting studies that “worked”, with the estimated
actual prevalence of these behaviours (using admission es-
timates) rising to nearly 100% [22].
Undisclosed analytical flexibility is a particularly insidi-
ous form of bias, as it resonates so deeply with the natural
human desire for seeking and embellishing information
that supports one’s beliefs and ignoring or discrediting
that which does not [1, 26]. This, combined with the unin-
tuitive nature of statistical inference, means that many a
selective reporting error may be made in ignorance [4, 30].
However, the easier path to publication for manuscripts
reporting strong, positive, consistent results, creates a
strong incentive for researchers to find and selectively re-
port such results. Therefore, while editorial decisions dur-
ing peer review remain influenced by the nature of a
study’s results, publication bias will persist as researcher
behaviour will adapt accordingly.
Initiatives to reduce publication bias and increase
transparency
To reliably inform treatment decisions, social policies,
or the design of the next incremental empirical study,
the published literature must include all available data
that is of acceptable quality [11]. While psychology and
social sciences may have led the way in demonstrating
and describing publication bias, medicine and, in par-
ticular, the systematic review and clinical trials move-
ment, has since led the avocation and implementation of
scientific practices to mitigate its effects. These include
public repositories for the mandatory registration of trial
protocols (e.g., ClinicalTrials.gov and ISRCTN), compre-
hensive guidelines for transparent reporting of proce-
dures and results (the EQUATOR network), and the
publication of study protocols.
Pre-registration
Registration of clinical trial protocols before data collec-
tion commences is now mandatory, making it possible
to trace trials from inception to completion. In the UK,
the National Institute for Health Research has gone a
step further and made publication of results, in addition
to protocol pre-registration, a legal obligation for all
studies that they fund. However, although this ensures
that the publication record is virtually complete, and
that risk of bias in results from questionable research
practices is reduced, the direction or strength of results
may still bias reviewer and editorial decisions, such that,
holding quality constant, null findings might end up in
lower impact journals [27, 28], or may take longer to be
submitted for publication at all [3].
Pre-registration of study protocols is a powerful tool
against some forms of publications bias. The protocol
repository provides an audit trail for studies, recording
what should be present in a complete publication record
and thus opening the file drawer. The inclusion of detailed
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analysis plans deters questionable research practices,
highlighting where data exploration deviates from the
planned test of the a-priori hypothesis. Following medi-
cine’s example, several platforms supporting protocol pub-
lication have been launched to promote transparency in
psychology and the social sciences (e.g., the Centre for
Open Science’s Open Science Framework, and the
Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Science
(BITSS), to name just a few). Some journals, including the
medical journals of the BMC series, also publish study
protocol articles in an effort help to improve the standard
of medical research, reduce publication bias and improve
reproducibility.
Solutions
A problem as thorny as the publication bias will require
multiple interventions to resolve. However, a central aim
must be to re-align incentives for career progression
with those for conducting high-quality rigorous research.
The peer-review process offers a relatively self-contained
process during which this re-alignment might be
achieved, by basing editorial decisions on the scientific
rigour of study design alone. If publication is determined
by judgements of study quality, then it is expected that
researcher behaviour will adapt accordingly, but this
needs to be measured empirically. There are multiple
ways journals could shift reviewer and editorial decisions
towards concerns of study quality.
Journals’ publishing ethos and guidance
Many journals provide guidance to encourage authors
and reviewers to focus on assessing study quality. For
example, in 2015, BioMed Central introduced a Minimum
Standards of Reporting checklist for authors and reviewers
[23]. The ethos of some open access journals, including
the journals of the BMC series, explicitly state that editor-
ial decisions are based solely on whether the work meets
rigorous technical and ethical standards. However, if re-
views are based on full papers which include results, any
judgements about technical rigour are likely to be con-
founded by the results; as described above, methods from
null studies will likely be judged as less rigorous, and the
implications of methodological limitations as much
greater. While such initiatives are a positive step to ad-
dressing publication bias, bias will inevitably persist, due
to the powerful retrospective influence results have on
how study quality is assessed.
Perhaps the only way to prevent the review and editor-
ial process being influenced by a study’s results is to base
the decision to publish solely on assessing the scientific
merit of the study rationale, and the appropriateness and
rigour of the proposed methods, without access to the
results and discussion. This aligns the reward of publica-
tion with study quality. There are two routes by which
this could happen. The first is where a commitment to
publish is made before the study is begun, based on the
strength of the study protocol, as in the case of Regis-
tered Reports [8]. The second is where a decision to
publish is made after study completion in the usual
manner, but where the results and discussion sections of
the paper are withheld, and reviewers decide whether
the study merits publication based solely on the back-
ground and methods sections.
Registered reports
The Registered Reports (RR) format was pioneered in
the journal Cortex [8], and since been adopted by over
40 journals, from a regular publication option to issuing
special issues (https://osf.io/8mpji/wiki). In RRs, the
study protocol is submitted for peer review before any
experiments are conducted and, if the protocol is deemed
to have scientific merit, an editorial commitment is made,
in advance, to publishing the outcomes. Armed with this
provisional acceptance, authors can conduct the research
safe in the knowledge that the results themselves will not
determine the article's publication [9].
The RR format has many advantages; it allows for peer
review at a point where reviewers can suggest key im-
provements to study design, rather than simply stating
why the experiment is flawed. It also clearly prevents the
results from biasing the decision to publish. However,
RRs impose time restrictions and may delay the start of
studies by several months while the protocol undergoes
peer review. The practicalities of busy academic life
mean that RRs are unlikely to fully replace the trad-
itional review process. Academics likely have a range of
scientific endeavours, and RRs may suit the timescale or
more confirmatory nature of some studies, but not neces-
sarily others in their portfolio. For example, the timing of
final year undergraduate student projects may be difficult
to fit into a RR format [6].
‘Results-free’ peer review
As there will likely be a place for the traditional ‘post-
study’ peer-review process for some time, a logical and
relatively simple way to encourage editorial decisions to
be based on a study’s methods is to blind reviewers and
editors to the study’s results. This month, BMC Psychology
launches a pilot to trial a new ‘results-free’ peer-review
process, to address the bias in the editorial process. Edi-
tors and reviewers will be blinded to the study’s results,
and decide whether to accept or reject manuscripts based
on the scientific merits of their rationale and methods
alone. Authors submit otherwise complete manuscripts,
but omit any discussion of results, and provisional accept-
ance is based on peer review of the background and
methods alone. The results and discussion of accepted
manuscripts may then be reviewed in a second stage, to
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check for adherence to methods and to allow minor
revisions.
This simple approach offers an eloquent solution to
many of the key drivers of publication bias discussed
above, and a recent pilot in a politics journal of a similar
process [13] indicates that ‘results-free’ reviews are feas-
ible, and acceptable to authors and reviewers, though
the numbers were relatively small. ‘Results-free’ review
should tackle bias that occurs during the actual review
process, by preventing reviewer judgments of study
quality being biased against studies with null results. It
also incentivises authors to write up high-quality studies
with null results, and might dissuade them from submit-
ting low-quality studies with dubious positive results.
Knowing that the reviewers will be focussing on the ra-
tionale and methods might also improve the quality and
transparency of methods reporting. Thus, ‘results-free’
review has the potential to increase the transparency of
methods reporting, improve the scientific quality of pub-
lished research, and increase in the overall reliability of
results.
Evaluating the effectiveness of proposed solutions
There has been a proliferation in new publishing initia-
tives designed to reduce publication bias, and while this
is laudable, it is important that these initiatives are sys-
tematically and rigorously evaluated to ensure they are
having the desired outcomes. BMC Psychology is taking
the bold step to conduct a randomised controlled trial to
evaluate their ‘results-free’ peer-review process. In the
first instance, a single arm pilot will assess the feasibility
of ‘results-free’ review and optimise the process. Follow-
ing this we plan to conduct a full randomized controlled
trial to assess the effects of results-free review on publi-
cation bias and the editorial decision-making process,
and collating author, editor, and reviewer feedback. If
deemed feasible and effective, it is our hope that we may
roll out results-free review (with any revisions) across
other BioMed Central journals. We have designed the
process to be as simple as possible, as an alternative
model that can be integrated as part of the traditional
review process, or more radically, to replace traditional
post-study review if the evidence shows it to be superior.
We welcome comments and feedback on the process as
the trial progresses.
Concluding remarks
Addressing a problem as thorny as the wider reproduci-
bility crisis will require multiple interventions to resolve,
but a central philosophy must be the re-alignment of in-
centives for career progression with those for conducting
high quality rigorous research. Scientist should be en-
couraged to conduct and publish science of the highest
scientific rigour and integrity, and this will only be achieved
if editorial decisions are based on the methodological
quality of the research rather than its outcomes. The
results-free review model, launched this month in BMC
Psychology, offers a solution by focusing editorial deci-
sions on the scientific rigour of the study design, and
preventing editorial decisions being unduly biased by
study findings. The human powers of self-persuasion
and post-hoc justification mean that withholding results
from peer-reviewers may be the only reliable way to pro-
tect reviewers and editors against the often unconscious
influence of the results justifying the means.
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